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Abstract
To implement EU climate policy, the UK’s New Labour government (1997–2010) elaborated 
an ecomodernist policy framework. It promoted technological innovation to provide low-
carbon renewable energy, especially by treating waste as a resource. This framework 
discursively accommodated rival sociotechnical imaginaries, understood as visions of feasible 
and desirable futures available through technoscientific development. According to the 
dominant imaginary, techno-market fixes stimulate low-carbon technologies by making 
current centralized systems more resource-efficient (as promoted by industry incumbents). 
According to the alternative eco-localization imaginary, a shift to low-carbon systems should 
instead localize resource flows, output uses and institutional responsibility (as promoted 
by civil society groups). The UK government policy framework gained political authority by 
accommodating both imaginaries. As we show by drawing on three case studies, the realization 
of both imaginaries depended on institutional changes and material-economic resources 
of distinctive kinds. In practice, financial incentives drove technological design towards 
trajectories that favour the dominant sociotechnical imaginary, while marginalizing the eco-
localization imaginary and its environmental benefits. The ecomodernist policy framework 
relegates responsibility to anonymous markets, thus displacing public accountability of the 
state and industry. These dynamics indicate the need for STS research on how alternative 
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sociotechnical imaginaries mobilize support for their realization, rather than be absorbed 
into the dominant imaginary.
Keywords
anaerobic digestion, bioenergy, mechanical and biological treatment, sociotechnical imaginaries, 
techno-fixes, UK low-carbon strategy
Introduction: Techno-fixes as policy agendas
Debates about climate change pit incumbent high-carbon systems against more desirable 
low-carbon replacements. Amidst these contending agendas for technological change, 
some proposals – such as geoengineering, biofuels, and carbon capture and storage 
(CCS) – have been criticized by civil society groups as ‘techno-fixes’, even as ‘false 
solutions’ that perpetuate ‘carbon lock-in’ (Corporate Watch, 2008, 2019; ETC Group, 
2015; FoEE, 2015). Such criticisms have been theorized by academics from various 
perspectives (e.g. Luke, 2010; Markusson et al., 2017; Unruh and Carillo-Hermosilla, 
2006). Despite such criticisms, techno-fix agendas remain prevalent in efforts to address 
global challenges such as climate change.
The techno-fix concept originated from recognizing the dilemma of complex soci-
etal problems. Alvin Weinberg, former director of Oak Ridge National Laboratory, 
coined the term ‘technological fix’ as a more feasible alternative to ‘social engineer-
ing’ (Johnston, 2018). He asked: ‘Can we identify quick technological fixes for pro-
found and almost infinitely complicated social problems?’ (Weinberg, 1966: 4; also 
1995).
Techno-fixes have been long criticized as over-simplistic solutions to complex prob-
lems (Rosner, 2004). In similar terms, they are seen as hubris in the face of ‘wicked 
problems’ whose contradictory or unstable requirements cannot have a single solution 
(Hulme, 2014). The technofix pattern has been critically analyzed as ‘technological solu-
tionism’, which presumes rather than investigates the specific problem it is trying to 
solve. In an idealized version, the correct combination of computer codes, algorithms 
and robots can solve all our problems (Morozov, 2013). Nevertheless, techno-fixes are 
attractive solutions for decision-makers seeking avoid responsibility for various indus-
trial or political problems.
Many critiques have counterposed the need for social and institutional change beyond 
or alongside technological change, on several grounds. Science-led technological inno-
vation has a limited capacity to fix societal problems, which instead warrant ‘social 
policy’ (Sarewitz, 1996). Problem complexity is why techno-fixes generally don’t suc-
ceed, except in the most straightforward cases (Nelson and Sarewitz, 2008).
Despite their divergence on the limitations of techno-fixes, both advocates and critics 
imply a clear distinction between social and technological change. This can be simplistic 
if presuming a choice between a social or technological intervention. The latter is always 
sociotechnical, involving societal order, often change.
Techno-fix agendas likewise have an ambiguous relationship to policy change. 
They have helped justify some shifts in policy, while serving to avoid others (as with 
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biofuels, Levidow and Papaioannou, 2014, 2016; Raman et al., 2015). The latter role 
also can be seen in policy agendas for low-carbon technologies. At a global and 
national level, states have promoted market instruments as a necessary means to stimu-
late such technologies.
This market-driven agenda has been personified by Nicholas Stern since his report, 
The Economics of Climate Change, emphasizing that ‘policy must promote sound mar-
ket signals’ for low-carbon development (Stern, 2006: i). He has advocated ‘radical 
change in approaches to cities, energy systems and land use’, especially through techno-
logical change (Stern, 2015: 6). From his diagnosis of market failure, Stern has advo-
cated carbon markets as an arbiter of low-carbon technologies: ‘We should have a very 
open-minded attitude to technology and let the markets decide which to choose, without 
putting obstacles in the way that might arise from an antipathy to a particular technology’ 
(Stern, 2008, our emphasis).
According to critics, this policy framework displaces responsibility: ‘Many govern-
ments are meanwhile hoping that major climate investment decisions can be simply left 
to the new carbon markets’ (Lohmann, 2009: 1064). In emissions trading schemes, 
agents’ responsibilities are determined by daily market prices rather than by relevant 
governmental agencies (Page, 2012: 938, 940). Such policy frameworks pervasively rely 
on market instruments for technological solutions, while appealing to market competi-
tiveness as means and ends. For this reason, we characterize the prevalent policy frame-
work as techno-market fixes.
Anticipatory governance of new technologies could be extended to techno-market 
fixes as a means to gain public accountability. Anticipatory governance has been defined 
as 'a broad-based capacity extended through society that can act on a variety of inputs to 
manage emerging knowledge-based technologies while such management is still possi-
ble'. This approach has elicited some scepticism, for example, that technoscience may 
render anticipatory governance complicit in its hubris (Guston, 2014: 218). Indeed, state-
led processes of anticipatory governance may end up conferring epistemic authority 
upon some technoscience-based visions rather than others.
To explore techno-market fixes, this paper compares how the UK government has 
promoted technoscientific solutions for bioenergy and for waste-energy issues. To ana-
lyse the latter in greater detail, this article discusses the following questions: What have 
been the different visions of societal futures? How did each one link technological solu-
tions with institutional arrangements (change or continuity)? How did the UK policy 
framework relate to the different visions? How did anticipatory efforts gain epistemic 
authority for some visions rather than others? How did waste-energy outcomes relate to 
earlier promises of benefits, and with what accountability?
To answer these questions, this paper draws on the theoretical framework of socio-
technical imaginaries, as elaborated in the next section (Jasanoff, 2015; Jasanoff and 
Kim, 2009). The discussion of sociotechnical imaginaries will help illuminate how the 
UK’s techno-fixes rest on a particular ecomodernist policy framework, which we discuss 
in the subsequent section. This theoretical linkage enables us to compare rival imaginar-
ies for UK low-carbon trajectories, as summarized in Table 1 and our conclusion. The 
comparison highlights continuities in policy narratives regarding societal visions, 
techno-market fixes and epistemic reasoning.
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Table 1. Rival imaginaries of a low-carbon future from biomass or waste. The lower part 
corresponds to the waste-conversion case studies.
Dominant: techno-market fix Alternative: eco-localization
Stakeholder groups Large energy and waste-
management companies; 
technology suppliers; 
government Ministries
Zero Carbon Britain (CAT, 2007),
Campaign Against Climate 
Change,
Friends of the Earth (FoE), 
Transition Towns
Public good: 
substitutes for 
fossil fuels
Low-carbon technologies 
will more efficiently convert 
feedstock as inputs to 
centralized systems, thus 
greening them.
Low-carbon systems (energy, 
agriculture, transport) should 
minimize resource burdens, 
localize resource flows and 
diversify output uses.
Socio-political 
order
Let the market decide on 
optimal techno-trajectories in 
response to financial incentives 
and penalties.
Establish support measures 
for localizing institutional 
responsibility for low-carbon 
systems.
Policy incentives 
most favourable
PFI waste infrastructure 
subsidy drives investment in 
large energy-from-waste  
(EfW) plants.
Renewable Obligation 
drives large-scale electricity 
generation.
PFI programme incentivizes large, 
inflexible facilities rather than 
maximize recycling.
Feed-in-Tariff has incentivized 
small-scale plants, but the tariff 
declined after 2010.
The Renewable Heat Incentive 
was meant to expand heat use 
– but inadequate to incentivize 
new infrastructure for heat 
distribution.
‘Sustainable’ 
biomass usage
Residual or sustainable 
biomass, defined in a broad 
way, is conversed to energy 
as input-substitutes for fossil 
fuels.
Biomass is valuable resource for 
recycling or carbon sequestration 
in the soil, only exceptionally for 
energy production (e.g. woody 
plants).
2nd generation 
biofuels (non-edible 
feedstock)
R&D priorities envisage 2G 
fuels as large-scale input-
substitutes for fossil fuels, 
dependent on mandatory 
quotas
Mandatory quotas may lock-
in conventional biofuels 
and perpetuate the internal 
combustion engine.
Waste feedstock 
for conversion
 
Energy-from-waste 
(EfW) plants
for municipal solid 
waste
EfW outputs can go to gas or 
electricity grids anywhere as a 
global good.
EfW plants waste resources and 
make little use of their surplus 
heat.
Epistemic authority Know-how for maximizing 
waste-based energy production 
to substitute for fossil fuels
Know-how for bringing waste up 
the hierarchy through conversion 
processes and output uses
 (Continued)
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Methods
This paper draws on the three UK research projects. Each project reviewed relevant 
academic, policy, industry, civil society, and trade press literature. Documents were 
analysed for assumptions, visions or expectations about several aspects of the research 
topic, including: technological innovation, environmental sustainability, feedstock 
sustainability, feedstock conversion, market incentives, waste hierarchy, operational 
scale, and responsibilities. We then conducted interviews based on findings from the 
document review.
Our retrospective analysis draws on theoretical perspectives about how ‘technology 
in use’ undergoes adaptive adjustments (Edgerton, 2006). We compared earlier anticipa-
tions with outcomes a decade later, paying particular attention to changes in priorities 
and technoscientific designs. In doing so, we follow Hyysalo et al. (2018: 10) who note: 
‘There is an opportunity to extend enquiry longitudinally – which may serve to increase 
Dominant: techno-market fix Alternative: eco-localization
AD roles (optimal) Large-scale biogas production 
(energy company vision).
Larger-scale plants diversify 
feedstock sources to maximize 
subsidy income
On-farm waste management 
(farmer and NGO vision) with 
biogas for local use.
AD feedstock 
sources (optimal)
Food waste can be 
supplemented by maize to 
stabilize electricity production
On-farm plants convert animal 
slurry, which otherwise would 
pose an environmental burden, 
while locally using all outputs.
Maize feedstock worsens 
environmental burdens.
AD: uses of 
digestate  
and heat
Plant operators pay a gate fee 
to spread low-mineral digestate 
on farms.
Concentrating the mineral 
content could create a widely 
transportable product.
On-farm digestate, familiar to 
each farmer, readily substitutes 
for chemical fertilizer.
Find nearby uses also for surplus 
heat.
MBT design and 
trajectory
MBT to generate RDF for 
EfW plants → electricity 
substituting for fossil fuels →
a global good (energy company 
vision)
MBT biostabilization plants will 
generate minimize methane 
emissions, significantly reduce 
output volume and produce a 
Compost-Like Output (CLO) as 
soil improver (NGO vision).
MBT operation in 
practice
RDF-to-EfW plants produce 
energy as global good, saving 
GHG emissions in relation to 
fossil fuels.
RDF-to-EfW plants generate 
more net GHG emissions than 
the landfill option.
Yet MBT-CLO plants have had 
operational difficulties for reliable 
outputs.
Table 1. (Continued)
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our robustness of understanding of innovation processes and their outcomes.’ However, 
it was difficult to identify key individuals still involved from a decade earlier; hence, our 
historical data depend mainly on documentary sources.
Sociotechnical imaginaries construing futures: Analytical 
perspectives
Imaginaries denote desired or construed futures. They can ‘guide a critical mass of self-
confirming actions premised on their validity’, thus constituting a future world (Jessop, 
2010: 338). Critical analysis seeks ‘to explain why and how some construals are selected, 
get embodied in individual agents or are routinized in organizational operations’ (Jessop, 
2010: 339), institutionalizing specific practices in the process.
As understood by cultural political economy, an ‘imagined economic space’ may 
become grounded in an ‘imagined community of economic interest’ (Jessop, 2005: 162). 
In order to assemble effective coalitions, actors ‘articulate strategies, projects and visions 
oriented to these imagined economies’ (Jessop, 2010: 345). Economic imaginaries often 
frame territorial jurisdictions as competitive units in an economic fight with foreign 
rivals. For example, ‘Europe’ becomes a single political-economic competitive space 
facing a common external threat (Rosamond, 2002: 169). In their performative role, 
imaginaries serve to mobilize economic resources, thus creating the conditions to achieve 
specific futures. Similar concepts are developed in STS regarding how ‘sociotechnical 
imaginaries’ articulate ‘the relationship of science and technology to political institu-
tions’ (Jasanoff and Kim, 2009: 120).
Dominant sociotechnical imaginaries
An early definition of sociotechnical imaginaries describes them as ‘collectively imag-
ined forms of social life and social order reflected in the design and fulfillment of nation-
specific scientific and/or technological projects’ (Jasanoff and Kim, 2009: 120). 
Sociotechnical imaginaries describe what constitutes the public good or a good life, 
especially as promoted by a state agency. Such an imaginary is ‘an important cultural 
resource that enables new forms of life by projecting positive goals and seeking to attain 
them’ (Jasanoff and Kim, 2009: 122). In this way, they can inform and justify innovation 
policies:
Such policies balance distinctive national visions of desirable futures driven by science and 
technology against fears of either not realizing those futures or causing unintended harm in the 
pursuit of technological advances. S&T policies thus provide unique sites for exploring the role of 
political culture and practices in stabilizing particular imaginaries. (Jasanoff and Kim, 2009: 121)
An imaginary may serve to mobilize various organizations and resources, shaping 
‘the hearts and minds of human agents and institutions’ level (Jasanoff, 2015: 17).
By turning to sociotechnical imaginaries, we can engage directly with the ways in which 
people’s hopes and desires for the future — their sense of self and their passion for how things 
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ought to be — get bound up with the hard stuff of past achievements, whether the material 
infrastructures of roads, power plants, and the security state, or the normative infrastructures of 
constitutional principles, juridical practices, and public reason. (Jasanoff, 2015: 22)
The concept helps to understand ‘why different moral valences attach to new sci-
entific ideas and technological inventions’; likewise ‘how actors with authority to 
shape the public imagination construct stories of progress in their programmatic state-
ments, and how they blend into these their expectations of science and technology’ 
(Jasanoff, 2015: 337). Conversely, imaginaries can help states to gain authority for 
exercising power (Jasanoff and Kim, 2009: 123). The concept helps to explain ‘how 
technological and political orders are co-produced’ in distinctive ways (Jasanoff and 
Kim, 2009: 124). Any national debate reinforces ‘patterns of public reason, evidence 
production and knowledge uptake that constitute a nation’s political culture’ (Jasanoff 
and Kim, 2009: 140).
Although early formulations emphasize nation-states as key actors, others can origi-
nate visions that become communally adopted: ‘Multiple imaginaries can coexist within 
a society in tension or in a productive dialectical relationship’ (Jasanoff and Kim, 2015: 
4). This signals key questions: How do multiple sociotechnical imaginaries envisage the 
public good in conflicting ways, and how do these play out in effect? A critical approach 
needs to analyse state-level narratives of the ‘good life’, especially whether they are ‘col-
lectively imagined’ by the entire society or else face rival visions of the future (Tidwell 
and Tidwell, 2018: 104). This perspective pushes researchers to analyse how an imagi-
nary becomes contentious, as elaborated next.
Ecomodernist context of rival imaginaries
In ecomodernist policy frameworks, states aim to stimulate the self-regulation of indus-
try, thus transferring responsibilities from the state to the market (Mol, 1996: 306). 
Through market-based instruments such as environmental taxes, the ‘greening’ of indus-
try involves a process of ‘economizing ecology’, or attributing economic value to envi-
ronmental resources and burdens (Mol, 1997: 141). Such agendas promote techno-fixes 
and justify institutional changes to facilitate them:
[Ecomodernism] uses the language of business and conceptualizes environmental pollution as 
a matter of inefficiency, while operating within the boundaries of cost-effectiveness and 
administrative efficiency … [Ecomodernism] is … basically a modernist and technocratic 
approach to the environment that suggests that there is a techno-institutionalist fix for the 
present problems (Hajer, 1995: 31–32).
Since the 1990s, policy frameworks have promoted techno-fix agendas for market-
driven eco-efficiency gains. The analytical concept ‘techno-market imaginary’ describes 
such frameworks that promote innovation, entrepreneurship, venture capital and carbon 
markets. The techno-market imaginary ‘allocates a primary role to the private sector in 
addressing climate change, lending this imaginary a broad appeal across multiple con-
stituencies’, which include financial interests competing on global carbon markets 
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(Levy and Spicer, 2013: 664, 669). This concept links the ecomodernist perspective 
with cultural political economy.
The techno-market imaginary … assumes that the environment is somewhat vulnerable, but 
that the climate issue is manageable through appropriate economic incentives and technological 
innovation, without fundamentally compromising lifestyles or economic growth. This 
imaginary’s positioning highlights its hegemonic appeal, by claiming to reconcile economic 
and environmental concerns (Levy and Spicer, 2013: 666).
Hence, the techno-market imaginary has gained policy dominance over rival imagi-
naries, for example, ‘fossil fuels forever’ and ‘sustainable lifestyles’, though they still 
maintain some support.
As a contentious case in many countries, state authorities have incentivized the expan-
sion of biofuels with feedstock from edible biomass and/or waste wood. In Michigan, for 
example, a sociotechnical imaginary anticipated efficient bioenergy plants providing 
cleaner, renewable and therefore sustainable energy production. This framed woody bio-
mass as residual, dispensable and thus sustainably available. By contrast, some local 
views were more cautious about its environmental sustainability. Nevertheless the state 
imaginary expressed ‘confidence, authority, credibility, and a capacity to tame and con-
trol any wickedness bioenergy may pose’ (Eaton et al., 2014: 250).
In EU and some national imaginaries of biofuels, market incentives stimulate techno-
scientific advances for eco-efficiency improvements and competitive exports. According 
to the UK’s Renewable Energy Strategy, UK biofuel producers ‘will have the opportu-
nity to compete in a global market if they can meet the European mandatory standards’ 
(DECC, 2009a: 111). This imaginary provided a response to controversy over the envi-
ronmental and social sustainability of early biofuels. They were retrospectively renamed 
‘conventional’ or ‘first-generation’. This implied a temporary role in a transition to sec-
ond-generation and hence more advanced biofuels using waste or non-food feedstock, 
thereby avoiding harm from conventional biofuels.
Invoking such a future transition, the European Union (among other state authorities) 
mandated statutory quotas for renewable energy in all transport fuels (EC, 2009). The 
only short-term option was conventional biofuels, so the quota stimulated a market that 
otherwise would not exist. It gained some epistemic authority from the promised 
advances; yet these have remained elusive, thus perpetuating the current fuel system:
This powerful strategy aims to project the illusion of radical change while concealing that the 
envisioned technological developments strive to maintain the status quo rather than altering it 
to achieve a better and greener future. In this sense the sociotechnical imaginaries of advanced 
biofuels, provided through the epistemic authority of international organizations, are devoid of 
utopian potential (Kuchler, 2014: 436).
Like the EU, the UK’s sociotechnical imaginary anticipated that second-generation 
biofuels would eventually link environmental sustainability with competitive advantage, 
as a basis for greening transport fuel. These epistemic claims depended on specific mod-
els of GHG savings from various non-edible feedstock for second-generation biofuel 
plants. Such accounting framed all such resources as ‘waste’, that is as a burden lacking 
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other potential uses; this normative assumption underlay calculations justifying waste 
conversion to energy for lower GHG emissions. On this basis, the dominant imaginary 
promoted ‘institutional change that reinforces infrastructural dependence on liquid fuel 
for the internal combustion engine’ (Levidow and Papaioannou, 2014: 280). For these 
reasons, the UK’s statutory quota for biofuels became increasingly controversial.
Beyond Western countries, we can see analogous cases of techno-market fixes. In 
Thailand, for example, rival sociotechnical imaginaries that intertwine with political 
economy in different ways are a defining characteristic of recent energy transitions. The 
dominant imaginary advocates the energy security of Thai industry, and thus increasing 
Thailand’s economic competitiveness, through continued economic growth, state finan-
cial incentives, and the combined use of renewables and coal. At the same time, however, 
an alternative imaginary rooted in civil society questions market expansion, asking about 
who will benefit from increased energy. It prioritizes ‘sustainable development as a 
social and environmental project of sustaining lives without hampering the ability of 
nature to replenish itself’ (Delina, 2018: 54). This alternative advocates the decoupling 
of economic growth from fossil fuel consumption, greater equity in the use of resources, 
better livelihoods, and decentralized energy solutions, for example, by helping ordinary 
Thai households to generate electricity through rooftop solar panels (Delina, 2018). The 
latter vision can be seen as an eco-localization imaginary.
After Japan’s 2011 nuclear disaster, Fukushima Prefectura proposed alternatives to 
the country’s national energy plan, thus generating rival imaginaries. They differ on 
many issues, especially on how hydrogen should be deployed as either part of Japan’s 
centralized energy system or part of its transition to a locally distributed renewables-
based society. The former agenda invokes global market imperatives. ‘Economically 
oriented rhetoric in the national hydrogen imaginary portrays ambitions of maintaining 
Japan’s global leadership in hydrogen and fuel-cell technologies in the interests of main-
taining international competitivity in a niche but rapidly growing global market’ 
(Trencher and van der Heijden, 2019: 217). Japan’s rival imaginaries have been some-
what accommodated by the flexible design of hydrogen technology:
since hydrogen can be produced from both fossil fuels and renewables through either centralised 
or decentralised energy systems, the imaginary of a hydrogen future is able to generate support 
from fossil fuel incumbents in favour of a centralised energy system … just as much as from 
renewable energy protagonists in favour of decentralised models of local production and 
consumption. (Trencher and van der Heijden, 2019: 210)
Hydrogen futures have an interpretive flexibility that broadens their appeal to actors 
with diverse expectations, values and expertise (cf. Eames et al., 2006).
These examples illustrate how environmental problems are framed in divergent ways 
through rival imaginaries, especially techno-market versus eco-localization ones (see 
also Feola and Jaworska, 2018; Levidow and Papaioannou, 2016; North, 2010). 
Ecomodernist policy frameworks can discursively accommodate these imaginaries, 
perhaps softening tensions between them. As the dominant imaginary, techno-market 
fixes appeal to an economic imaginary (Jessop, 2005), especially the nation as a single 
competitive space facing a common external threat and market opportunity (Rosamond, 
2002).
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In the name of innovative solutions, moreover, techno-fixes can help avoid systemic 
change. This role has a long history:
Calling for innovation is, paradoxically, a common way of avoiding change when change is not 
wanted. The argument that future science and technology will deal with global warming is an 
instance. It is implicitly arguing that, in today’s world, only what we have is possible. (Edgerton, 
2006: 210)
More broadly, regardless of whether a significant change is wanted by some publics, 
a techno-fix can reinforce dominant production-consumption systems.
The UK ecomodernist framework for a low-carbon 
strategy
Within the EU ecomodernist framework, the UK’s dominant sociotechnical imaginary 
envisions centralized systems as the most efficient and cost-effective strategy for transi-
tioning to a low-carbon future. At the same time, the UK’s low-carbon strategy features 
different visions about technoscientific innovation helping to localize systems for greater 
environmental benefits. These dual imaginaries co-exist in tension, as we show below in 
the example of renewable energy and a more detailed analysis of waste-conversion tra-
jectories. (See the upper half of Table 1.)
Renewable energy fixes
For its low-carbon strategy, the New Labour government (1997–2010) stimulated new 
markets for emerging technologies through several policies including research and 
development funds, landfill tax and market quotas. Under the Renewables Obligation, 
electricity suppliers had to source ten percent of their electricity from renewable sources 
by 2010. By relying on market mechanisms, the government tried to ‘bolt environmental 
goals onto its existing economic strategies’ (Revell, 2005: 358). But market-type instru-
ments could not resolve the tensions between economic and environmental objectives.
Alongside the dominant imaginary of centralized systems, government policy 
included an imaginary of both localizing and decarbonizing energy supplies for multiple 
public benefits. For example, the 2003 Energy White Paper emphasized greater use of 
biomass for combined heat and power, especially for small-scale local uses. The docu-
ment promoted multiple bioenergy sources as important components ‘in widening fuel 
diversity and energy security in the transport sector’ (DTI, 2003: 69).
Later UK reports reiterated an eco-localization imaginary: ‘a combination of new and 
existing technologies are opening up new possibilities for carbon reduction by producing 
and using heat and electricity at a local level, that is, distributed or decentralised energy’ 
(DTI, 2007: 12). ‘A further factor that is likely to increase the economic favourability of 
bioenergy is the decentralisation of power generation through microgeneration’, accord-
ing to the UK Energy Research Centre (UKERC, 2009: 3). Energy localization depends 
on local communities. Therefore, for renewable energy in general, UK strategy should 
attempt ‘to ensure stronger local participation in projects, and sharing of benefits via local 
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communities’, according to the statutory Committee on Climate Change (CCC, 2011: 
106).
In parallel, the government went beyond EU targets for greenhouse gas reductions. 
The 2008 UK Climate Change Act set a 2050 target date for a statutory duty to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions by 80%, relative to the 1990 baseline. To fulfil this target, 
the government sought ‘a secure, low-carbon future’. Its strategy sought to decarbon-
ize the electricity sector, as a step towards substituting electricity for fossil fuels. 
Most remedies invoke the key term ‘efficiency’, that is technologies more efficiently 
producing or using energy, especially from renewable sources. In particular, ‘[w]e 
will also need a bigger, smarter electricity grid’, argued the Department of Energy and 
Climate Change (DECC, 2009b: 10); this centralized system was seen as relatively 
more efficient.
The government’s policy framework for a low-carbon transition sought to reconcile 
environmental aims with dominant economic interests. It positioned itself as proactive 
with regard to climate change, constantly engaging and building ‘partnerships’ with 
industrial and other non-governmental actors, thus blurring responsibility for solutions 
(Carvalho, 2005: 15). Various pro-industry policies were addressing climate change, 
while also pursuing economic aims: ‘climate change was subsumed in wider agendas 
and was often used to justify externally-motivated measures’ (Carvalho, 2005: 19–20). 
Climate protection has been the putative rationale for policies that prioritize other 
aims, especially economic growth via low-carbon industry. The ‘further rapid growth’ 
of the sector has been advocated by the Department of Energy and Climate Change 
(DECC, 2009b: 61).
Tensions arose between sociotechnical imaginaries for bioenergy in particular. Civil 
society alliances had long advocated a transition that would decentralize renewable 
energy and reduce energy demand across several sectors. In the eco-localization imagi-
nary, biomass had the modest roles of recycling natural resources and sequestering car-
bon. By contrast, the dominant imaginary promoted biomass conversion as an 
input-substitute for fossil fuels within centralized energy systems; technoscientific inno-
vation would convert lignocellulose through substantial inputs of energy and water 
(Levidow and Papaioannou, 2016).
The eco-localization imaginary was elaborated in the Zero Carbon Britain 2030 
report. It advocated government policies that would help create a market for low-energy, 
low-carbon technologies (CAT, 2007). Dominant assumptions about energy efficiency 
were inverted: small-scale renewables ‘help increase efficiency and decrease demand’ 
(CAT, 2010: 16). Its agenda gained support from the Campaign Against Climate Change 
but no national political mobilization to obtain the necessary policy instruments and 
economic resources.
Some community initiatives have set up locally owned production of renewable 
energy, especially in areas distant from the national grid. Some urban initiatives also 
have pursued such a transition pathway, but they tend to encounter greater obstacles:
These [UK alternative] pathways focus less on ‘upstream’ large-scale technologies and more on 
reconfiguring local energy and transport systems. These alternative transition pathways receive 
less attention and resources, which shows that the dominant prognostic discourse privileges the 
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interests of centralized incumbent actors rather than those of less organized and local actors. 
(Geels, 2014: 32)
The government promoted financial incentives meant to stimulate eco-efficient tech-
noscientific innovations. Such programmes were intended to foster lower-carbon trajec-
tories, substitute renewable energy for fossil fuels, and reduce waste or use it in 
environmentally beneficial ways. Policy incentives have been conceptually justified by 
‘market failure’, to be corrected by support measures for ensuring fair market competi-
tion and thus technological innovation:
Innovative renewable technologies face many barriers to their development and successful 
commercialisation, and the Government has a fundamental role in setting frameworks in which 
markets can operate fairly and effectively to help the private sector bring technologies through 
to large-scale deployment. (HM Govt, 2009: 136)
Indeed, the UK government has claimed to be technology-neutral by ‘allowing the 
market to decide’ innovation priorities amongst low-carbon options (cited in Levidow and 
Papaioannou, 2016). Within this policy framework, short-term policy commitments have 
presumed that specific technologies would become competitively self-financing. From 
2010 onwards, feed-in-tariffs targeted small-scale electricity generation at levels <5 MW 
from solar, offshore wind and bioenergy. This financial incentive was advocated by envi-
ronmental NGOs as means to expand renewable energy sources, especially in decentral-
ized forms (Toke, 2012).
From the government perspective, however, the tariffs aimed to establish the com-
mercial viability of new technologies. On such grounds, after 2010 the tariff levels 
underwent a stepwise decline. This made new small-scale investments too risky, while 
leaving incumbent energy companies to incorporate such technologies into their large-
scale systems.
As a different support measure, from 2002 onwards the Renewables Obligation 
required energy suppliers to supply increasing proportions of electricity from renewable 
sources and to gain validation through Renewable Obligation Certificates. But the 
Renewables Obligation focused on large-scale generation at capacity above 5 MW. Also, 
the focus on electricity ignored heat-only applications. This incentivized an expansion of 
bioenergy plants, initially with edible biomass and/or woodchips, sometimes co-fired 
with coal.
Large-scale biomass conversion became an imperative in the UK’s dominant socio-
technical imaginary. This framed ‘sustainable biomass’ in a broad way (e.g. woodchips 
from North America) as a renewable input-substitute for centralized systems. Efficient 
conversion was nearly equated with environmental sustainability: 2G biofuels ‘should 
make the production of biofuels from land much more efficient, with a reduced area 
needed to produce a given volume of biofuels’, declared the Department of the 
Environment and Rural Affairs (DEFRA, 2007a: 22, 36).
The policy narrative warned against locking-in environmentally sub-optimal path-
ways, yet these were framed narrowly as problematic feedstock sources (e.g. edible bio-
mass or biomass-coal co-firing). They became a temporary, transitional step towards 
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more a sustainable future and thus not a lock-in. Moreover, the public good was equated 
with current infrastructure. According to industry stakeholders, biofuels as input-substi-
tutes help to protect the investment value of the current transport-energy infrastructure, 
as well as consumer freedom through private motor vehicles. Thus the dominant imagi-
nary reinforced incumbent energy companies and infrastructural dependence on liquid 
fuel for the internal combustion engine (Levidow and Papaioannou, 2014).
Analogous tensions between dual imaginaries arose in techno-trajectories for treating 
waste as a resource, as shown in subsequent sections.
Waste-conversion fixes
Throughout the EU, waste-management systems have been undergoing pressures to 
move beyond mere disposal, especially landfill, whose methane emissions are a potent 
greenhouse gas. As well as reducing greenhouse gas emissions and waste generation, EU 
policy has promoted various means to recover resources to substitute for products 
dependent on fossil fuels. The framework outsources the task to the private sector, which 
is then expected to deal with such tensions:
Municipal waste-management companies perform the fix. They operate in institutional 
environments that sometimes allow them to act on markets but in other instances prevent them 
using the full potential of their material management competence and infrastructure in an 
economically competitive manner. (Hultman and Corvellec, 2012: 2418)
The EU formalized the waste hierarchy with its priorities: prevent, reduce, reuse, 
recycle or recover waste. The 2008 EC Waste Framework Directive ‘brings a modernised 
approach to waste management, marking a shift away from thinking about waste as an 
unwanted burden to seeing it as a valued resource’ (CEC, 2010: 5; also DEFRA, 2011a; 
EC, 2008). The waste hierarchy integrates the ‘alternatives of reducing waste and extract-
ing value from it’ (Corvellec and Hultman, 2011: 5–6) (Figure 1).
Decisions on waste-treatment plants have faced several intersecting pressures. In the 
EU policy framework, several measures sought to move waste away from disposal. The 
EC Landfill Directive (1999/31/EC) obliges Member States to reduce the amount of 
biodegradable municipal waste going to landfill to 50% of 1995 levels by 2013 and 35% 
by 2016 – or by 2020 for some countries, including the UK (EC, 1999).
Within the EU framework, UK policy has long promoted the waste hierarchy as a 
‘guiding principle’ for new facilities (DEFRA, 2007b: 2). The policy links environment 
with economy: ‘The dividends of applying the waste hierarchy will not just be environ-
mental. We can save money by making products with fewer natural resources, and we 
can reduce the costs of waste treatment and disposal’ (DEFRA, 2007c: 9).
Alongside renewable energy, the UK government has sought to reduce greenhouse 
gas emissions from waste-management practices through joint solutions with industry. 
Implementing the EC Landfill Directive, the UK’s Landfill Tax Escalator set a timetable 
for annual tax increases that rose sharply starting in 2005 and quadrupling in the subse-
quent decade; this drove up the gate fees paid to waste-management companies. This rise 
stimulated efforts towards waste reduction and kerbside segregation, which in turn 
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facilitated recycling and organics segregation; the latter provides inputs for a composting 
process or anaerobic digestion plants.
Despite efforts at segregating components of municipal solid waste, large quantities 
still need an outlet. UK policy promoted waste-to-energy plants: ‘Generating renewable 
energy from biomass waste could also significantly reduce the amount of waste that is 
landfilled in the UK’ (HM Govt, 2009: 87, 104). When more waste was diverted to new 
incinerators, however, they often faced public opposition. Some protests demanded alter-
natives to minimize waste transport (Dodds and Hopwood, 2006; Rootes, 2009). 
Although these protests rarely closed down plants, the conflict deterred many local 
authorities from commissioning new incinerators and pushed them towards alternatives 
with greater local responsibility, as shown in the two case studies that follow.
To go beyond conventional energy-from-waste (EfW) plants, UK support measures 
stimulated private-sector investment in Advanced Thermal Treatments. In particular, a 
gasification process aimed to produce a clean syngas (synthetic gas) that could substitute 
for fossil fuels. Yet such experimental plants had great difficulties treating variable het-
erogeneous feedstock (Levidow and Upham, 2017). Regardless of the technology, civil 
society groups denounced all thermal processes for wasting resources and undermining 
pressures to minimize waste production (UKWIN, 2010). These critics counterposed a 
circular economy to restructure and localize production processes, reducing waste 
(UKWIN, 2016).
Those rival visions were subjected to the market-efficiency rationale of the UK frame-
work: ‘Government policy is driven by the desire to drive waste up the hierarchy’ 
(DEFRA, 2014: 67). As the underlying diagnosis of the problem, market failures generate 
Figure 1. Waste hierarchy.
credit: DEFRA.
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environmental externalities, warranting policy intervention. For the waste-management 
sector, for example: ‘Ensuring that the amount of waste is reduced to the economically 
efficient level, and is optimally managed, will ensure that waste policy is delivering net 
benefits for society as a whole’ (DEFRA, 2011b: 4, 8). This policy framework has sought 
temporary adjustments in markets so that they keep waste within economically-environ-
mentally optimal levels and facilitate its conversion.
Market adjustments have meant to incentivize industry’s task, namely: matching tech-
nology appropriately with feedstock in order to move waste up the hierarchy. ‘There are 
a range of technologies for recovering energy from waste. It’s a question of matching the 
right technology with the right fuel, depending on the nature of the fuel and the desired 
outputs’ (WRAP, quoted in REA, 2011: 2). Yet in practice such ‘matching’ is often 
elusive.
UK policy has sought to stimulate new markets for technological improvements by 
treating waste as a resource, especially through renewable energy production. Creating 
the ‘right’ price signals for business became the favoured government means to address 
environmental challenges. Financial devices shaped the ability to re-scale waste by spa-
tially distancing waste from its point of production and transforming it into a resource for 
energy (Reno, 2011).
UK policies have relied on financial incentives stimulating local authorities to privat-
ize waste management. Consequently, new commercial markets turned waste into a 
resource for large EfW plants. Waste-treatment systems shifted to a larger scale that is 
distant from any specific end-use. Consequently, some claims for global goods turned 
out to be environmentally contentious or rivalrous, that is mutually incompatible 
demands on the same resource (Alexander and Reno, 2014: 351–4).
The above discussion illustrates tensions between techno-market and eco-localization 
imaginaries. The latter underlay environmental NGOs’ support for two waste-treatment 
technologies in particular: Anaerobic Digestion (AD) that processes organic waste into 
producing low-carbon biogas plus digestate as a potential fertilizer, and Mechanical and 
Biological Treatment (MBT) that processes municipal solid waste in various ways.
The two UK cases have analogous features. In both cases, the initial technology 
designs were meant to move waste up the hierarchy, gaining broad support on that basis. 
For each technology, two sub-sections below analyse rival imaginaries; together these 
correspond to the lower half of Table 1.
Anaerobic Digestion: Dual sociotechnical imaginaries
Anaerobic Digestion plants can process organic material of various kinds (Figure 2). An 
oxygen-free chamber induces the organic matter to break down, producing a methane-
rich gas (biogas) and nutrient material (digestate). Biogas can be used as a source of heat 
for cooking, other types of food processing or space heating.
More complex, mature technological operations process biogas to produce heat and 
electricity in co-generation plants (combined-heat-and-power). Alternatively, they may 
purify and upgrade the biogas to natural gas standards (biomethane) for use in transport 
as a renewable alternative to fossil fuels. When outputs are connected to the electricity or 
gas grid, they must fulfil specific standards.
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After the turn of the century, small-scale AD plants were being multiplied within an 
agenda to reduce and source-segregate organic waste. This can be understood as an eco-
localization imaginary. However, financial instruments later shaped technological design 
towards supplying centralized energy systems; this has stimulated larger-scale, longer-
distance material flows. These dual imaginaries are analysed in the next two sub-sec-
tions, respectively.
Expanding AD for localized waste management
In the 1970s, the government began to see livestock waste as a pollution problem and 
legislated for its abatement. In the 1980s, it envisaged AD as enhancing the farm’s envi-
ronmental sustainability (Ward et al., 1995). The government’s farm waste-management 
plans helped stimulate around 30 farm-based AD units from the late 1980s to 1995 
(Bywater, 2011; Sanders et al., 2010). These were typically aided by grants for up to 
approximately half of the cost.
Digestate leftover from the AD process replaced the untreated slurry that was nor-
mally spread on soil, thus reducing the risk of pollution. AD also provided heat, which 
could be used on farms to run a boiler for heating farm buildings or providing hot water. 
In this context, waste was managed on-farm with the help of AD technology, adding 
benefits for farm sustainability.
The New Labour government’s eco-modernist approach reconceptualized waste 
as a resource for a low-carbon strategy. Its Biomass Strategy promoted AD for its 
Figure 2. Anaerobic digestion, feedstock sources and carbon cycle (Wikid Energy Funhouse, 2013).
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wider potential to manage diverse wastes, as well to reduce greenhouse gas emis-
sions, including those from manure, slurries and other biowaste. The government 
set out a vision to widely establish AD around the country by 2020, partly moving 
waste up the hierarchy (DEFRA et al., 2007). AD was conceptualized as a multi-
functional technology which would help manage waste, generate energy, provide 
bio-fertilizer and offer the UK a competitive advantage in technology export. As a 
flexible multi-scalar technology, AD would be promoted at different scales (DEFRA, 
2009).
Financial instruments were adjusted ‘to encourage a variety of energy recovery tech-
nologies (including anaerobic digestion) so that unavoidable residual waste is treated in 
the way which provides the greatest benefits to energy policy’ (DEFRA, 2007a: 14). One 
pre-existing mechanism was the landfill tax: ‘Increasing the tax to a higher level makes 
investments in alternative non-landfill treatments such as recycling and anaerobic diges-
tion more economically viable’ (DEFRA, 2007a: 34).
By the end of the decade, financial incentives specifically aimed to stimulate ‘small-
scale’ renewables through subsidy payments calculated by energy output, with smaller 
units receiving higher tariffs. First, the Renewable Heat Incentive rewarded renewable 
heat generators installed from 2009 onwards, providing a tariff payment (DECC, 2011). 
Second, after 2010, feed-in-tariffs targeted small-scale electricity generation at levels 
less than 5 MW.
Many stakeholder groups promoted future visions of localizing waste management 
and use, especially through AD (Levidow and Papaioannou, 2013, 2016). The AD pro-
gramme had support from environmental NGOs, for example: ‘To minimise the impact 
our waste has on the climate, Friends of the Earth believes that compostable and recycla-
ble material should be separated at source for treatment or reprocessing, using AD where 
suitable’ (FoE, 2007: 1).
Options for managing farm waste within farms or their neighbouring communities 
were essential to this future, as promoted by the Royal Agricultural Society of England 
(RASE, 2011). The National Farmers Union set out a vision of 1000 AD plants in the UK 
by 2020 with four different scalar models. They argued that regulatory criteria should not 
disadvantage single-farm or multi-farm community plants built with on-farm inputs and 
for on-farm use (NFU, 2009).
The feed-in-tariff scheme was meant to support small-scale installations, that is 
generating ‘less than 500 kW’. It incentivized many farm-based digesters at different 
sizes below 250 kW. Yet this ‘small’ classification neglected the challenges of generat-
ing even 500 kW with farm slurry and manure as the main feedstock. The average UK 
dairy farm has 100–130 cows producing slurry over 6–7 months, adequate for generat-
ing the biogas equivalent of only about 5 kWe (thermal equivalent for heat; Bywater, 
2011). Converting this heat to electricity, rather than simply using the heat on-farm, 
requires extra equipment and costs, which in turn means reconfiguring AD along dif-
ferent scalar lines.
The government’s 2011 Action Plan for AD endorsed localizing waste management 
as well as energy generation. The Plan highlighted ‘significant potential for increasing 
uptake in England’ if barriers could be overcome (DEFRA and DECC, 2011: 2). Yet 
financial instruments alone could not overcome the many obstacles.
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Expanding AD for electricity supply
Going beyond the farm, the UK strategy sought to recover and use waste from diverse 
sources through large AD plants, stimulated by electricity subsidy. This amounts to a 
techno-market fix for production-consumption systems that generate waste. The govern-
ment envisaged:
Putting even less of the waste we produce into landfills: The Government will encourage 
greater production of bioenergy, particularly from combustion. It also plans to encourage more 
processing of food waste, agricultural waste, and sewage using ‘anaerobic digestion’ to produce 
biogas. (DECC, 2009b: 5)
After 2002, the Renewables Obligation stimulated anaerobic digestion at the upper 
end of the plant-size spectrum, that is 250–500 kWe and even larger. AD plants have 
been upscaled in ways maximizing grid-fed electricity production. Through such 
market-based initiatives, ‘renewability focused on the farm is losing favour to new 
energy sources for the national grid’ (Reno, 2011). By building more AD plants, 
potentially beyond the capacity for feedstock collection (Eunomia, 2014), the system 
may lock-in a longer-term dependence on specific waste streams: ‘If AD plants are 
built, they need food waste collections in place. For these food waste collections to 
work, they need the public to continue wasting food – the very problem many are try-
ing to stop’ (Clay, 2016: 14).
Upscaling AD plants also increases the use of non-waste feedstocks. Larger plants 
depend on collecting, transporting and converting more diverse sources of organic mat-
ter. To ensure a steady operation with high-energy output, some have become dependent 
on maize. Its cultivation had previously trebled between 1990 and 2000 for animal feed. 
A decade later its cultivation increased further in response to financial incentives for AD 
feedstock. The industry justified the rising usage for AD plants on several grounds, espe-
cially that maize cultivation does not displace food crops and is more energy-efficient 
than other bioenergy crops, according to the Anaerobic Digestion and Biogas Association 
(ADBA, 2011: 5–6; More, 2017; see again Figure 2). Maize for AD feedstock sharply 
increased after 2012, soon reaching one-fifth of all maize cultivated (DEFRA, 2015).
This high-energy crop is treated as if it were waste; its easy conversion enhances the 
commercial success of large AD plants. In upscaling AD plants, many have become 
detached geographically from a specific feedstock source, from low-energy slurry and 
from the outputs’ end-users. Although the government accepted that such cultivation 
could be beneficial, it warned: ‘Any intensive production of a single crop could cause 
environmental concern, whether grown for food, as an AD-specific crop biomass or for 
transport biofuels’ (DEFRA and DECC, 2011: 13).
Environmental impacts of maize cultivation are controversial. According to critics, 
‘[m]aize crops have severe negative impacts on public goods like soils and fresh water’, 
especially from run-off of pesticides and nutrients. ‘Many farmers are being paid to 
cause significant harm to these public interests’ (Soil Association, 2015: 2). Thus the 
financial subsidies for AD were attacked as a perverse incentive for degrading or wast-
ing resources. According to the National Sheep Association, moreover, AD feedstock 
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depletes forage stocks; such ‘problems are caused by scale, either resulting in structures 
that damage the landscape or a mass change in crop use in particular regions’. These 
farmers criticized feed-in-tariffs and the Renewables Obligation for incentivizing crop-
based bioenergy at large scales (Gastin, 2018).
In promotional visions, AD’s liquid digestate is envisioned as a substitute for chemi-
cal fertilizers, which incur significant greenhouse gas emissions through their production 
and use (WRAP, 2016). Although farm-based AD provides such a substitute, this role is 
difficult for food-waste outputs converted into digestate, which is expensive to transport, 
difficult to spread, hard to store, and of varying quality. For these reasons, this potentially 
valuable resource is treated with suspicion by farmers and has generally remained an 
economic burden; operators must pay a gate fee for disposing digestate on agricultural 
land (ADBA, 2016a, 2016b, 2017: 8).
These tensions arose from a specific policy framework. Through a search for techno-
fixes, AD became an epistemic-technical challenge of how best to scale up waste conver-
sion while maximizing renewable energy yield (and other resource uses) to achieve 
low-carbon targets. This imaginary anticipated a future where current waste-generating 
systems remain largely intact.
Mechanical and biological treatment: Dual sociotechnical 
imaginaries
Local Authorities have made efforts to segregate waste for recycling or composting, 
especially through kerbside collections. Nevertheless, large amounts of recyclables 
remain in municipal solid waste. Statutory responsibility lies with individual Local 
Authorities or consortiums of them. To help them fulfil their statutory duty for landfill 
diversion, the UK’s Private Finance Initiative (PFI) scheme funded a Waste Infrastructure 
Delivery Programme between 2006 and 2011. This policy created some controversy.
An extra incentive came from the government’s ecomodernist framework. The rising 
landfill tax was supplemented by the Landfill Allowance Trading Scheme, which 
imposed penalties for any Local Authority exceeding its maximum allocation of bio-
degradable waste in landfills. This allowance could be traded with other Local Authorities, 
thus creating a market in landfill allowance and further incentivizing landfill diversion.
As a new solution during the PFI scheme, Mechanical and Biological Treatment 
(MBT) has been sought for several aims: to avoid local incineration (and thus protest), to 
reduce the output volumes needing disposal or transport, and to avoid the need for kerb-
side segregation. The PFI scheme funded approximately one-third of the 28 MBT plants.
Minimizing costs and avoiding controversies have been main drivers of Local 
Authority decisions, even if they are officially justified in environmental terms such as 
the waste hierarchy (interview, DEFRA, 21.12.2016). In many cases, MBT plants were 
commissioned as a substitute for source-segregating recyclables or food waste; it would 
be more expensive to pay for both systems at once. Environmental NGOs criticized some 
authorities for evading their responsibility to segregate waste, thus yielding poor-quality 
outputs, which ‘will fetch a lower value in the market’ (FoE, 2008: 5). Indeed, that dif-
ficulty later erupted into public protest, as shown below.
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MBT plants have basically two design types. One has sought to biostabilize the output 
for use as a soil improver, facilitating an eco-localization agenda, but this type encoun-
tered great operational difficulties. Another type has sought to maximize refuse-derived 
fuel (RDF), whose lower volume cheapens long-distance transport to seek the lowest 
gate fee (Figure 3; also Read et al., 2014). This design has been a techno-market fix for 
systemic waste burdens. Corresponding to dual imaginaries, these designs and their out-
comes are analysed in the next two sub-sections, respectively. These correspond to the 
two lower rows of Table 1.
Biostabilization design for output reuse
Some early MBT designs were meant to produce outputs for reuse. The process is 
intended to biostabilize organic waste as a Compost-Like Output (Figure 3a). This 
would generate much lower methane emissions and could improve soil, even recycle 
nutrients, according to company publicity. For example, ‘biostabilization aims to reduce 
the impact on the environment of the putrescible fraction of unsorted waste when land-
filled’ (Entsorga, 2016). Another company was contracted for an MBT plant ‘designed 
to divert over 75% of incoming material into a resource’, some eventually being used 
for land remediation (Biffa, n.d.). Rather than go to landfill, the municipal solid waste 
would be turned ‘into fuel, energy and a nutrient-rich soil enhancer’ (see concerns in 
Let’s Recycle, 2015).
Given the original promises, Friends of the Earth supported MBT biostabilization 
plants, especially for their flexible scaling and potential to localize waste systems, thus 
respecting the proximity principle. ‘Plants can be built on a small scale, which would not 
drag waste in from a large surrounding area’ (FoE, 2008: 3). FoE cautiously supported 
MBT biostabilization plants, with appropriate financial incentives:
Friends of the Earth believes that the government should introduce a lower rate of landfill tax 
for waste that has been adequately [bio]stabilised through an MBT process. This would have a 
significant impact upon the financial viability of MBT technologies in the UK. (FoE, 2008: 6)
Figures 3. MBT plants with alternative configurations.
credit: DEFRA.
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The UK government eventually promoted MBT biostabilization for landfill as the 
best environmental option (DEFRA, 2011b: 14). However, operational difficulties were 
anticipated by industry experts. ‘[T]he key to a successful operation is process flexibil-
ity; as during the operational life of a facility, many changes are likely, for example in 
waste composition, waste collection methods, material presentation, and so forth’ 
(Griffiths et al., 2009: 566). A more expensive design could flexibly accommodate such 
variations. But Local Authorities chose a cheaper design. Consequently, ‘[m]any UK 
plants will prove costly to remain functional to keep pace with future waste situations’, 
warned an industry consultant (Read, 2012).
After operations began, some plants found success in selling the Compost-Like 
Output (CLO) to farmers, for example as a soil remediator (Holder, 2014). Yet difficul-
ties arose with output quality, volume reduction and odour control at many other MBT 
biostabilization plants (Let’s Recycle, 2015). These problems had several causes: ‘poor 
build quality, under-sizing of the plant and misunderstanding of the technology’, espe-
cially the various process controls, for example air flow, moisture levels, feedstock turn-
ing and oxygen levels of the air flow (DEFRA expert, 20.06.2017).
Yet blame has been often displaced onto external causes, especially changes in waste 
composition of AD feedstock. As an early design assumption, half of municipal solid 
waste was residual organic in the mid-2000s. But in later years people were wasting less 
food, and food-waste collection systems became more successful, so kerbside bins had 
much less organic content than anticipated by MBT designs (interview, CIWM expert, 
23.01.2017; also interview, Ricardo-AEA, 06.01.2017).
Given the consequent difficulties of the biostabilization process, the output did not 
qualify as compost under government criteria. So the available options were little bet-
ter than landfill disposal. At best, ‘The CLO could be utilised in applications such as 
landfill restoration or some bulk fill uses’ if complying with the appropriate engineer-
ing and quality standards (DEFRA, 2013: 44). Likewise, according to industry experts, 
CLO would have low quality, suitable for ‘landfill restoration, landscaping or fuel crop 
production’ – at best, ‘saving the need for higher quality material in these instances’ 
(CIWEM, 2015: 5).
Conversion difficulties are illustrated by the high-profile failure of Lancashire County 
Council’s two MBT plants. After a 2002 public consultation drew responses overwhelm-
ingly against incineration, the Council adopted a policy not to incinerate municipal solid 
waste in Lancashire and then turned to MBT as an alternative. Eventually it agreed to a 
contract with an Australian company, Global Renewables. Based on its technology’s in-
built process control, the company claims to divert 66% of the feedstock from landfill 
and to produce a high-quality OGM® (Organic Growth Medium), a specific form of CLO 
(GR, n.d.). Its Lancashire plants were expected to achieve at least 57% landfill diversion 
– yet diverted <30% in practice (Let’s Recycle, 2013). Serious operational difficulties 
generated large waste stockpiles and odour problems, leading to complaints by staff and 
residents (Lancashire Evening Post, 2016).
Plants run by other Local Authorities encountered similar difficulties, which led to 
persistent odours and flies, provoking residents’ complaints, for example at Shanks’ 
Barrow plant (The Mail, 2015). Thus MBT plants elude technological-political control 
(cf. Moore, 2012: 789), provoking conflicts analogous to incinerators. Yet some protests 
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against new incinerators propose an MBT plant instead (Warne, 2013), thus echoing 
NGOs’ favourable view from years earlier.
As an extra problem of Lancashire’s plants, the CLO did not fulfil the quality standard 
as a soil improver for restoring brownfield sites until 2015, and even then at only one-
third the quantity expected. The Council blamed the decline in feedstock’s food-waste 
composition. In 2014, the Council cancelled the contract in order to take control of the 
operation (Lancashire Evening Post, 2016).
A further difficulty came from a change in government policy: the Landfill Allowance 
Trading Scheme was abolished in 2013. As the Council Leader explained, the govern-
ment moved the goalposts, so ‘we must take advantage of cheaper options to process 
Lancashire’s waste’, that is through landfill (quoted in Sanderson, 2016). By 2016, the 
Council decided to abandon the composting process altogether, on grounds that it was 
disproportionately expensive for the modest reduction in feedstock volume to CLO and 
thus the modest cost-savings. Instead, the output would be incorporated into RDF or sent 
to landfill (Sanderson, 2016).
The Lancashire case exemplifies a widespread failure of technological design across 
all the UK’s MBT plants (interview, DEFRA, 21.12.2016). As an industry-wide problem, 
those difficulties arose from over-optimistic claims for technological flexibility.
Promoters of MBT cited the technology’s flexibility, but waste-management contractors have 
not fulfilled or passed on this benefit. They generally are very restrictive about the feedstock 
composition requirements, even claiming that compositional variance has caused the treatment 
process to fail. In reality, contractors do not fully understand the technology that they have 
chosen and have oversold its benefits. (Personal communication, DEFRA expert, 20.06.2017)
In principle, PFI contracts were meant to remunerate the contractor’s expertise and 
responsibility to anticipate, avoid or manage any operational problems. When opera-
tional problems arise, however, ‘Each party tries to blame the other; a PFI contract is not 
an appropriate vehicle for risk-sharing’ (interview, Ricardo-AEA, 06.01.2017). This sys-
temic difficulty has arisen from the drive and expectations for a techno-market fix, with 
the result of blurring or shifting responsibility.
As another difficulty, MBT plants were expected to recover plastics for recycling. In 
practice, they have carried out a ‘dirty’ plastics recovery, where an energy-intensive pro-
cess is necessary to clean the plastics. Even so, plastic recyclates have lacked a competi-
tive advantage over virgin plastics, whose price has declined along with the oil price. So 
outputs have been generally incorporated into refuse-derived fuel (RDF) of a higher 
calorific value for cement kilns, low on the waste hierarchy. Market incentives have 
favoured an epistemic know-how valuing energy output per se.
Bio-drying design for RDF outputs
By contrast with the Local Authorities opting for MBT biostabilization, others opted 
for MBT-to-RDF plants (Figure 3b), mainly for financial reasons. During the 2006–
2011 PFI scheme, EfW plants were widely foreseen as charging RDF gate fees lower 
than the total of Landfill Allowance Trading Scheme plus the landfill tax, set to rise 
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every year for following next decade. As the main advantage, the MBT bio-drying 
process lowers the volume output, thus cheapening long-distance transport of RDF 
to EfW plants.
As it turned out years later, continental incinerators had lower gate fees than in the 
domestic market, so the UK’s RDF has been mainly exported there, thus further upscal-
ing the material flows and diffusing responsibility for outcomes. Indeed, plants have 
been designed more recently for exporting RDF to continental plants (interview, CIWM 
expert, 23.01.2017). The waste burden is effectively shifted across space and time, anal-
ogous to some other techno-fixes.
For the MBT-to-RDF type technology, the Shanks company’s Sistema Ecodeco (now 
E2E) process was adopted for plants of several Waste Authorities (East London, Cumbria, 
Dumfries and Galloway, etc.). The in-built control system guarantees the output quality, 
as reported by a UK delegation to Ecodeco plants abroad (MRMC, 2004: 2). RDF com-
bines various heterogeneous materials with a consistent calorific value for combustion in 
either incinerators or cement kilns (DEFRA, 2013: 28). RDF with high calorific value 
was foreseen as generating income from cement kilns, by retaining dense plastics rather 
than extracting them as recyclates. At best, however, RDF outputs have found a lower 
gate fee or cost-free disposal, not an income (interview, DEFRA, 21.12.2016).
Environmental benefits have been a contentious issue, strongly contingent on the 
epistemic choice of baseline counter-factual scenario. When some MBT plants were 
being configured for RDF output, this decision was justified on environmental grounds, 
namely, that the renewable energy output would replace fossil fuels (CIWEM, 2015: 
1–2). But which ones? Incineration seemed environmentally better if the RDF-EfW out-
put replaces coal, the worst baseline, as was the former practice in cement kilns.
According to critics back then, however, such a baseline would be made obsolete by 
future developments. Coal would be replaced by other fossil fuels, with lower green-
house gas emissions. Also the feedstock’s calorific value would decline through plastics 
segregation at kerbside or at MBT plants (Eunomia, 2006). Consequently, plausible 
future trends would weaken the earlier environmental assumptions favourable to incin-
erating RDF for greenhouse gas reductions (FoE, 2008: 2).
Eventually the government accepted those criticisms of the RDF design. According to 
DEFRA, MBT-to-landfill ‘provides the best emissions performance in terms of the treat-
ment/disposal of residual waste’. Yet this best option was contradicted by prevalent 
incentives: ‘The emissions from waste combustion of non-biogenic material (via any 
technology including mass-burn incineration) are … not comprehensively reflected in 
the price of disposal’, thereby creating a financial incentive for RDF production (DEFRA, 
2011b: 14, 25; cf. Eunomia, 2008). Thus it blamed anonymous market forces for envi-
ronmentally worse outcomes.
Given those doubts about the MBT-to-RDF option, the government sought to improve 
its environmental benefits through heat use. There ‘are potential balance points beyond 
which energy from waste could perform worse than landfill in carbon terms’, especially 
if the incineration plant generates only electricity and so wastes the heat. To ensure that 
incinerators improve carbon balances, it advocated a redesign for combined heat and 
power (CHP), especially by ensuring that ‘CHP-ready plants’ become ‘CHP in use’ 
(DEFRA, 2014).
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New RDF plants have been built with optimistic assumptions about using the surplus 
heat for local use and about subsidies stimulating such use. The Renewable Heat Initiative 
was meant as a market incentive but has had a subsidy rate much lower than for renew-
able electricity. Heat use has proven elusive, except in some new developments incorpo-
rating distribution systems. Retrofits of buildings are difficult and expensive: ‘The 
disruption involved in connecting a densely populated urban district up to a central 
source of heat risks adding to the opposition new incinerators routinely attract’ (Ballinger, 
2014). Thus surplus heat has found little use, despite an eco-localization imaginary in the 
UK policy framework.
Conclusion
Focusing on UK low-carbon waste-energy agendas, we asked: What have been the dif-
ferent visions of societal futures? And how did each vision link technological change 
with institutional arrangements (continuity or change)? How did the policy framework 
relate to the different visions? We approached these questions through sociotechnical and 
economic imaginaries, paying particular attention to how alternatives seek to contest 
dominant hierarchies (Jasanoff, 2015; Tidwell and Tidwell, 2018). Analysing actors’ 
strategies can help explain how those hierarchies persist, how alternative imaginations 
encounter obstacles and thus how they might be overcome.
In our case studies, divergent sociotechnical imaginaries can be understood as techno-
market fixes versus eco-localization. Both imaginaries depend on markets and economic 
resources of some kind. But a techno-market fix emphasizes several market-type ele-
ments: financial incentives as the main policy instruments, market competition as the 
means to stimulate technological improvements and strengthen global competitiveness. 
Together these elements constitute the nation as a competitive economic space, as a wider 
economic imaginary for mobilizing resources (cf. Jessop, 2005; Levy and Spicer, 2013).
Implementing the EU’s low-carbon policy, the UK has promoted new markets for 
technological innovation that could provide low-carbon renewable energy, or treat waste 
as a resource, or both at once. Financial instruments include landfill taxes, market quotas 
and subsidies. This policy was intended to reduce greenhouse gas emissions through the 
conversion process and/or outputs substituting for fossil fuels. Tensions amongst various 
policy objectives, especially environmental sustainability and economic growth, were 
reconciled by anticipating future technological innovations, such as ‘advanced’ biofuels 
that could convert surplus biomass and waste-conversion technologies that could move 
waste up the hierarchy.
Each technology has had diverse potential designs and societal visions, as summa-
rized in Table 1. Divergent trajectories correspond to rival sociotechnical imaginaries, 
that is narratives of the public good (cf. Jasanoff, 2015; Jasanoff and Kim, 2009). In the 
dominant techno-fix imaginary, current centralized systems should be made more 
resource-efficient through low-carbon technologies (as promised by industry incum-
bents). In the eco-localization imaginary, a shift to low-carbon systems should localize 
resource flows, output uses and institutional responsibility (as promoted by civil society 
groups). These dual imaginaries have informed divergent priorities within sectors such 
as renewable energy and waste treatment.
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The New Labour government’s ecomodernist policy framework combined the rival 
imaginaries, thus accommodating divergent visions of stakeholder groups, as a stronger 
basis for political authority. In parallel, low-carbon techno-market fixes gained epistemic 
authority through anticipatory reasoning. This authority has featured several kinds of 
know-how: for scaling up low-carbon technologies that previously occupied a specific 
niche, for maximizing energy yield from them, for more effective conversion processes, 
and for output uses that could bring waste up the hierarchy. This know-how rendered the 
policy framework more plausible. Such know-how has resonances with anticipatory 
governance of emerging technologies (Guston, 2014). Our case study highlights caveats 
about state-led governance selectively conferring epistemic authority on some imaginar-
ies and thus societal futures.
At the interface of waste treatment and low-carbon strategies, the UK’s ecomodernist 
framework mandated institutional changes to stimulate various techno-market fixes. The 
policy framework outsourced waste management and conversion to private-sector con-
tracts with Local Authorities. The latter then faced several difficulties, including higher 
charges for landfill disposal and protests against incineration. To avoid both difficulties, 
Local Authorities looked to novel technologies, especially anaerobic digestion (AD) and 
mechanical and biological treatment (MBT). Both technologies had an interpretive flex-
ibility, broadening their appeal to actors with divergent imaginaries.
Through those technological promises, the ecomodernist framework gained authority 
and broad acceptance, while obscuring or softening tensions between future visions. 
From its eco-localization imaginary, Friends of the Earth advocated specific technologi-
cal designs that could truly bring environmental improvements. But it said little about the 
policy framework or material-economic basis necessary to implement them. Thus its 
eco-localization imaginary remained marginal in most waste-energy trajectories.
The UK’s earlier bioenergy agenda drove techno-design towards bioenergy as an 
input-substitute for incumbent centralized energy systems while marginalizing alterna-
tive trajectories. For AD and MBT, financial incentives likewise incentivized technologi-
cal designs to maximize energy (electricity or gas) for centralized grid systems within the 
dominant sociotechnical imaginary. Both technologies have been increasingly designed 
for energy production as global goods, dependent on longer-distance waste flows, distant 
from the feedstock source or local responsibility.
Such outcomes are rivalrous, preempting other resource uses that would be envi-
ronmentally more sustainable. Both technologies have had difficulties converting 
waste into outputs going higher up the hierarchy, at least in a commercially viable 
way (e.g. compost improving soil, digestate replacing chemical fertilizers, and ‘dirty’ 
plastics replacing virgin plastics). There are many reasons for the difficulties, includ-
ing weak market incentives, unstable conversion processes, and low-quality outputs. 
These issues have precedents in earlier techno-fix strategies that were also aimed at 
converting waste into materials that would be less burdensome or even valuable. In 
the UK cases discussed in this article, the latter outputs remained elusive. With the 
exception of subsidized electricity, material conversions favoured (or had greatest 
success for) low-value outputs in resource terms. Some processes generated negative-
value outputs, whose burdens were shifted across space and time, that is were relo-
cated and/or delayed (cf. LeCain, 2004).
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The UK’s ecomodernist framework promoted environmental benefits that were rarely 
realized in practice. Although it stimulated some waste-management improvements, they 
neither brought waste very far up the hierarchy nor localized its management. Investment 
decisions and outcomes largely favoured incumbent interests, reinforcing dominant 
energy and waste systems, while continuing large-scale waste production. Prevalent tra-
jectories remained low on the waste hierarchy, closer to disposal. Investment priorities 
eventually marginalized the eco-localization imaginary.
This political-economic outcome has resulted from an ecomodernist policy frame-
work dependent on financial incentives. Institutional decisions anticipated various future 
trends – output rewards (feed-in-tariffs, Renewables Obligation Certificates, Renewable 
Heat Incentive, recyclate prices), waste-disposal costs (Landfill Allowance Trading 
Scheme, landfill tax, gate fees), technological capacities and political obstacles such as 
local protest. The policy mantra, ‘letting the market decide’, has relegated responsibility 
to anonymous markets, displacing public accountability of the state and industry (Page, 
2012: 940). Indeed, calling for technoscientific innovation is ‘a common way of avoid-
ing change’ (Edgerton, 2006), or at least a change in the incumbent actors.
Let us return to our introduction: Debates over techno-fixes have left ambiguous the 
relationship between technological and societal change, which may seem like distinctive 
solutions. As shown here, however, the same technology could be designed and pro-
moted for diverse societal futures, involving sociotechnical changes of different kinds. In 
our case studies, the specific design was shaped through multi-stakeholder interactions, 
policy frameworks and resource mobilization for specific trajectories. More generally, 
some basic technologies have potential trajectories either conforming to the incumbent 
system or else transforming it (Smith and Raven, 2012).
Socially equitable transitions, including civil society agendas for eco-localization, 
depend on the necessary conditions for marginal actors to prevail over incumbent ones. 
These dynamics imply the need for further research on how alternative imaginaries help 
advocates to mobilize support for their realization. How do they seek economic, institu-
tional and policy support? In some cases, how do alternatives inadvertently become 
absorbed into the societal vision and policy instruments of the dominant imaginary? Or 
else how do they contest and even transform it? To investigate such questions, research 
could carry out longitudinal studies of ‘technology in use’ (Edgerton, 2006; Hyysalo 
et al., 2018), while integrating theoretical perspectives on sociotechnical and economic 
imaginaries (Jasanoff, 2015; Jessop, 2005).
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